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Abstract
In most classical models of belief change, epistemic states are represented by the-
ories (AGM) or formulas (Katsuno-Mendelzon) and the new pieces of information by
formulas. The Representation Theorem for revision operators says that operators are
represented by total preorders. This important representation is exploited by Dar-
wiche and Pearl to shift the notion of epistemic state to a more abstract one, where
the paradigm of epistemic state is indeed that of a total preorder over interpretations.
In this work, we introduce a 3-valued logic where the formulas can be identified with
a generalisation of total preorders of three levels: a ranking function mapping inter-
pretations into the truth values. Then we analyse some sort of changes in this kind of
structures and give syntactical characterizations of them.
1 Introduction
Classical propositional logic is the most common choice when studying and modelling belief
change operators (see for instance [10, 19, 20]). In the classical AGM framework [1, 11],
for instance, epistemic states are represented by theories and new pieces of information
by propositional formulas. In the Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) framework [13], on the other
hand, epistemic states as well as new pieces of information are propositional formulas. In
both AGM and KM settings, the new information is intended to express a fact about the
world and this new knowledge must always be included in the epistemic state resulting from
the revision process.
A very useful tool in order to understand the logical model is the Representation Theo-
rem for revision operators. It says that operators are represented by assignments mapping
epistemic states to total preorders and the output is a formula or theory having as models
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the minimal models of the new piece of information with respect to the preorder associated
to the old epistemic state. As a matter of fact, this tool is exploited by Darwiche and Pearl
[9] to shift the notion of epistemic state to a more abstract one, where the paradigm of epis-
temic state is indeed that of a total preorder over interpretations. In our view, this work
together with Boutilier’s Natural Revision [8] is one of the most influential in a series of
works trying to capture some kinds of semantical behavior via a syntactical characterization
[6, 7, 12, 16, 15, 17, 18, 21].
In this work, we follow this tradition but in a new way. The semantical structures of
preorders are represented in a language. In order to do that, we introduce a 3-valued logic
with modalities where the formulas can be identified with a generalisation of total preorders
of three levels: a ranking function mapping interpretations into the truth values.
The typical situation we want to model here is as follows. There is an intelligent agent
working within a finite propositional 3-valued logic on n variables. Each variable in this
logic, as customary, represents an atomic “fact” about the world. We chose a 3-valued logic
because this agent does not necessarily have an opinion –or knowledge– about every single
atomic fact.
Our agent has classified all the possible worlds, i.e. all the truth assignments into three
blocks L1, L2 and L3. Those in L1 are the most plausible scenarios. Assignments in L2
are assignments about which the agent is uncertain. She doesn’t know wether to accept or
reject these worlds. At the level L3 the agent puts the worlds which she considers unlikely.
In the same manner as propositional classical logic captures all the structures at two
levels (accepted or rejected), we present here a logic in which the formulas capture all the
three levels’ structures. In order to do that, we propose here the use of the Kleene Strong
three valued logic [3] plus two modalities which will be necessary for the completeness of
the representation.
Thus, with the help of this logic, we can model belief change under uncertainty. In
order to understand the mechanisms which govern the changes, we begin with a particular
operator we call Cautious Improvement. The way to describe the changes produced in the
old epistemic state by the new piece of information is reminiscent of the changes produced
by the improvement operators introduced in [16] (see also [15, 17]).
It is worth to note that in our framework, both the (old) epistemic state and the new
piece of information are formulas. Since they are formulas in our new logic, they are both
(complex) epistemic states. Therefore, we return, in a natural way, to the paradigm of
revising an epistemic state by an epistemic state first proposed by Benferhat et al. in [2].
The operator of cautious improvement is characterized syntactically. An analysis of the
techniques involved in the definition and in the syntactical characterization allows us to
find a general method for defining all the operators under uncertainty and extract syntactic
postulates that characterize them.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Kleene strong 3-valued logic with
two new modalities is defined. Therein is proven that every ranking function mapping
interpretations into an ordered scale of three elements can be represented by a formula of
this new logic. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of the cautious improvement operator
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and its syntactic characterization. In Section 4 we characterize each of the 39 (19,683)
possible change operators in our logic. In Section 5 we compare our results with other
works in the literature. In Section 6, we conclude with some remarks and give some lines of
future development of this work. Finally, in Appendix A we give a combinatorial proof of
the necessity of our two modalities in order to be able to represent all the “total preorders”
over interpretations of three levels (Theorem 2).
2 The Logic
We work within a modal variant of finite KS3 , the Kleene strong 3-valued logic [14] (see also
[3]), with variables x0, x1, . . . , xn−1. We will call Varn the set of these variables. The usual
version of KS3 has the same syntax as classic propositional logic. We include the symbol ‘⊥’
as the logical constant that always evaluates to 0. For the semantics, we have three possible
truth values: 1 representing truth, 0 for falsehood and 1/2 for non-determined. The truth
tables for the connectives are the following:
P Q P ∧Q
1 1 1
1 1/2 1/2
1 0 0
1/2 1 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 0
0 1 0
0 1/2 0
0 0 0
P Q P ∨Q
1 1 1
1 1/2 1
1 0 1
1/2 1 1
1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 1/2
0 1 1
0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0
P Q P −→ Q
1 1 1
1 1/2 1/2
1 0 0
1/2 1 1
1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 1/2
0 1 1
0 1/2 1
0 0 1
P ¬P
1 0
1/2 1/2
0 1
For the sake of brevity, let’s say that a valuation ω is a quasi-model of θ iff ω(θ) = 1/2
and a countermodel of θ′ if ω(θ′) = 0. Then we say that ω is a quasi-model of a set Σ iff
it is a quasi-model for all the formulas in Σ. The notion of model is the same as in classic
propositional logic. A formula is a contradiction if it only has countermodels.
Regarding semantics, we have to define some usual symbols:
1. For two formulas α, β we write ≡ when they have the same truth table.
2. We write α  β when every model of α is a model of β i.e. we use this symbol with
its classic interpretation.
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3. We write α

β to abbreviate α  β and β  α.
Note that in this logic there are no tautologies. Actually, it is easy to check that for all
interpretation ω taking the constant value 12 , we have that for every formula ϕ, ω(ϕ) =
1
2 .
We extend KS3 by adding the modal operators ♦1 and 1. Our syntax is also extended
by the new formation rule stating that if ϕ is a formula then ♦1ϕ and 1ϕ are also formulas.
The modal operators are interpreted as follows:
ϕ ♦1ϕ
1 1/2
1/2 0
0 0i
ϕ 1ϕ
1 1
1/2 1
0 1/2
Intuitively, ♦1 worsens the truth value of ϕ and 1 improves it. It is easily noted that
1ϕ = ¬♦1¬ϕ, so these are dual operators.
Note that in KS3 extended by 1 there are many tautologies. As a matter of fact, for
every formula ϕ, the formula 11ϕ is a tautology.
With the use of ♦1 and 1 we can find, given a truth assignment ω, a formula ϕω such
that its only model is ω. Indeed, given a truth assignment ω = 〈t0, t1, . . . , tn−1〉 on Var,
we have the formula
ϕω := α0 ∧ α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn−1
where each αi is a formula given by
αi =


xi if ti = 1
¬xi if ti = 0
1xi ∧1¬xi if ti = 1/2
This formula evaluates to 1 if, and only if, all of the αi’s evaluate to 1, thus the only model
for ϕω is ω. Notice that it can have more than one quasi-model. On the other hand, if
{ω0, ω1, . . . , ωk−1} is a set of truth assignments, the formula
ϕω0,ω1,...,ωn−1 :=
∨
0≤i≤n−1
ϕωi (1)
has the interpretations in {ω0, ω1, . . . , ωk−1} as its only models.
We can also give “normal” forms that allow us to “push” the modal operator ♦1 within
parentheses. One can easily check that
♦1(θ1 ∧ θ2) ≡ ♦1θ1 ∧ ♦1θ2
and that
♦1(θ1 ∨ θ2) ≡ ♦1θ1 ∨ ♦1θ2
On the other hand, for reasons that will become apparent later, we are going to introduce
the modal operator ♦2 and its dual 2 whose semantics are given by the truth tables
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ϕ ♦2ϕ
1 1
1/2 0
0 0
ϕ 2ϕ
1 1
1/2 1
0 0
It is also easy to check that
♦2(θ1 ∧ θ2) ≡ ♦2θ1 ∧ ♦2θ2
and
♦2(θ1 ∨ θ2) ≡ ♦2θ1 ∨ ♦2θ2
We denote by KS3 + ♦1 + ♦2 the modal extension of K
S
3 by ♦1 and ♦2 and by K
S
3 + ♦i
the extension by ♦i for i = 1, 2. The set of all the formulas in this logic is denoted by F .
2.1 Formulas and preorders
In the finite case, KS3 + ♦1 + ♦2 over the set of variables
Varn = {x0, x1, . . . , xn−1}
we have the set
In = {ω0, ω1, . . . , ω3n−1}
containing all the interpretations on Varn.
Each formula ϕ in KS3 +♦1+♦2 induces a partition of In into three blocks L1(ϕ), L2(ϕ)
and L3(ϕ) defined as
L1(ϕ) = {ω ∈ In : ω(ϕ) = 1}
L2(ϕ) = {ω ∈ In : ω(ϕ) = 1/2}
L3(ϕ) = {ω ∈ In : ω(ϕ) = 0}
It is easy to check that the relation ϕ, defined as
ω ϕ ω
′ ⇐⇒ ω ∈ Li(ϕ), ω
′ ∈ Lj(ϕ) with i ≥ j
is a ‘total preorder’. Thus, the first level contains the worlds accepted by ϕ; the second
level contains the uncertain worlds of ϕ and the third level contains the worlds rejected by
ϕ.
More precisely, we can see ϕ as a ranking function rϕ : In −→ {0,
1
2 , 1}, where rϕ(ω) =
1 when ω ∈ L1(ϕ), rϕ(ω) =
1
2 when ω ∈ L2(ϕ) and rϕ(ω) = 0 when ω ∈ L3(ϕ). We regard
L1(ϕ), L2(ϕ) and L3(ϕ) as the levels of ϕ. Notice that every formula defines one of these
three-level preorders (ranking function). Such a preorder must have at least one non empty
level.
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Given a ranking function r : In −→ {0,
1
2 , 1} we also use the notation Lj(P ) for levels
on the preorder P defined by it, that is ωPω′ iff r(ω) ≥ r(ω′) and L1(P ) = r
−1(1),
L2(P ) = r
−1(12) and L3(P ) = r
−1(0). Note that these ‘preorders’ are indeed more general
than total preorders. For instance, with ranking functions we can distinguish different
constant functions mapping all the interpretations to different levels, whereas considered
as simply total preorders, all these different ranking functions are identified with the same
flat total preorder. By abuse of notation, in this work we will continue to call three-level
preorder P , any partition in three levels given by a ranking function r : In −→ {0,
1
2 , 1}.
We will prove that for every three-level preorder P on In there is a formula in K
S
3 +
♦1 + ♦2 that characterizes it.
Theorem 1. Given a three-level preorder P in In, there is a formula φP in K
S
3 +♦1 +♦2
such that for every interpretation ω in In:
1. ω(φP ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ω ∈ L1(P ),
2. ω(φP ) = 1/2 ⇐⇒ ω ∈ L2(P ), and
3. ω(φP ) = 0 ⇐⇒ ω ∈ L3(P ).
Proof. We know, due to Equation 1, that there are formulas ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3 such that
ω(P ) = 1 if and only if ω ∈ Lj(P ). Define the formula
φP := ¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)
Then,
ω ∈ L1(P ) ⇐⇒ ω 6∈ L2(P ) and ω 6∈ L3(P )
⇐⇒ ω(ψ2), ω(ψ3) ∈ {0, 1/2}
⇐⇒ ω(♦1ψ2) = ω(♦2ψ3) = 0
⇐⇒ ω(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3) = 0
⇐⇒ ω(¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)) = 1
i.e.,
ω ∈ L1(P ) ⇐⇒ ω(φP ) = 1
For the characterization of the second level, we have
ω ∈ L2(P ) =⇒ ω(ψ2) = 1 and ω(ψ3) ∈ {0, 1/2}
=⇒ ω(♦1ψ2) = 1/2 and ω(♦2ψ3) = 0
=⇒ ω(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3) = 1/2
=⇒ ω(¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)) = 1/2
On the other hand,
ω(¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)) = 1/2 =⇒ ω(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3) = 1/2
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=⇒ ω(♦1ψ2) = 1/2 or ω(♦2ψ3) = 1/2
It is not possible to have ω(♦2ψ3) = 1/2 because the truth value of ♦2ψ3 is either 1 or 0
under any interpretation, thus it must be ω(♦1ψ2) = 1/2, so ω(ψ2) = 1 and as a consequence
ω ∈ L2(P ).
Hence
ω ∈ L2(P ) ⇐⇒ ω(φP ) = 1/2
for any interpretation ω.
Finally, for the third level:
ω ∈ L3(P ) =⇒ ω(ψ2) ∈ {0, 1/2} and ω(ψ3) = 1
=⇒ ω(♦1ψ2) = 0 and ω(♦2ψ3) = 1
=⇒ ω(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3) = 1
=⇒ ω(¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)) = 0
For the converse, we have
ω(¬(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3)) = 0 =⇒ ω(♦1ψ2 ∨ ♦2ψ3) = 1
Thus, either ω(♦1ψ2) = 1 or ω(♦2ψ3) = 1. Since ω(♦1θ) ≤ 1/2 for every formula θ, it must
be the case that ω(♦2ψ3) = 1, so ω(ψ3) = 1 and ω ∈ L3(P ). Consequently
ω ∈ L3(P ) ⇐⇒ ω(φP ) = 0
Henceforth φP captures the preorder P .
Theorem 1 shows that every preorder on In is characterized by a formula inK
S
3 +♦1+♦2.
In Theorem 2 we prove that both ♦1 and ♦2 are needed for this.
Theorem 2. KS3 + ♦i with i = 1, 2 is not enough to define every 3-level preorder on In.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. There are three-level preorders on all the interpretations on Varn that can
not be defined by any formula in KS3 .
3 The Cautious Improvement Operator
We want to define a belief revision operator of the kind
∗ : F ×F −→ F
Thus, in this framework we are going to represent both epistemic states and epistemic
inputs by formulas in KS3 +♦1+♦2. Also the outputs will be represented by the same type
of formulas.
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3.1 Definition of the operator
For a fixed n ∈ N we first define ∗ as a binary operator on 3-level preorders over In. The
following table gives the level of an interpretation ω in ϕ ∗ θ given the levels where it is
located in ϕ and θ:
ω L1(θ) L2(θ) L3(θ)
L1(ϕ) L1(ϕ ∗ θ) L2(ϕ ∗ θ) L2(ϕ ∗ θ)
L2(ϕ) L1(ϕ ∗ θ) L2(ϕ ∗ θ) L3(ϕ ∗ θ)
L3(ϕ) L2(ϕ ∗ θ) L2(ϕ ∗ θ) L3(ϕ ∗ θ)
(2)
We have defined ∗ as a binary operator on preorders. Thanks to Theorem 1, we can
define ∗ as a binary operator on formulas, but still referring to preorders: given formulas
ϕ and θ, the formula ϕ ∗ θ is the one corresponding to the preorder ϕ ∗ θ. Also notice
that ϕ ∗ θ =ϕ∗θ.
We can make two observations:
First, Table 2 yields a truth table for ϕ ∗ θ
ϕ θ ϕ ∗ θ
1 1 1
1 1/2 1/2
1 0 1/2
1/2 1 1
1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 0
0 1 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0
Second, via the identification of formulas with preorders we can write Lj(φ) instead of
Lj(φ) for any given formula φ.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of this operator.
3.2 Postulates
Lemma 1. The Cautious Improvement Operator satisfies the following postulates
(ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ θ)

ϕ ∗ θ (CI1)
((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)

¬(ϕ ∗ θ) (CI2)
Proof. CI1: If ω((ϕ ∧ θ)∨ ((1ϕ∧1¬ϕ)∧ θ)) = 1 then either ω(ϕ∧ θ) = 1 or ω((1ϕ∧
1¬ϕ) ∧ θ) = 1. In the first case, ω(ϕ) = ω(θ) = 1 thus ω ∈ L1(ϕ) ∩ L1(θ) and this
implies by Table 2 that ω ∈ L1(ϕ ∗ θ), and so ω(ϕ ∗ θ) = 1.
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ϕω1 ω2 ω3
ω4 ω5 ω6
ω7 ω8 ω9
∗
θ
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
ω5
ω6
ω7
ω8
ω9
=
ϕ ∗ θ
ω7ω4
ω1 ω2 ω5 ω8 ω9
ω3 ω6
Figure 1: Example of operator’s behavior
In the second case, we have ω(1ϕ ∧ 1¬ϕ) = ω(θ) = 1 which implies that ω ∈
L1(θ) = 1. On the other hand,
ω(1ϕ) = 1 =⇒ ω(ϕ) ≥ 1/2
and
ω(1¬ϕ) = 1 =⇒ ω(¬ϕ) ≥ 1/2
=⇒ ω(ϕ) ≤ 1/2
then
1/2 ≤ ω(ϕ) ≤ 1/2
thus
1/2 ≤ ω(ϕ) = 1/2
and ω ∈ L2(ϕ). Hence ω ∈ L1(ϕ ∗ θ) by Table 2 and ω(ϕ ∗ θ) = 1.
Conversely, if ω(ϕ ∗ θ) = 1 then ω ∈ L1(ϕ ∗ θ). There are only two cases in Table 2
that make this possible: either ω ∈ L1(ϕ) ∩ L1(θ) or ω ∈ L2(ϕ) ∩ L1(θ).
If ω ∈ L1(ϕ) ∩ L1(θ) then ω(ϕ) = ω(θ) = 1 and ω(ϕ ∧ θ) = 1. If ω ∈ L2(ϕ) ∩ L1(θ)
then ω(1ϕ ∧ 1¬ϕ) = 1 and ω(θ) = 1, hence ω((1ϕ ∧ 1¬ϕ)θ) = 1. Thus if
ω(ϕ ∗ θ) = 1 we have that ω((ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ θ)) = 1.
CI2: Suppose ω is an interpretation such that ω(((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)) = 1.
Then either ω(((1ϕ∧1¬ϕ)∧¬θ)) = 1 or ω(¬ϕ∧¬θ) = 1. In both cases ω(¬θ) = 1
which implies that ω ∈ L3(θ). In the first case, ω(1ϕ ∧ 1¬ϕ) = 1 implies that
ω ∈ L2(ϕ) thus ω ∈ L2(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ). In the second case, ω(¬θ) = 1 implies that
ω ∈ L3(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ). In both cases ω ∈ L3(ϕ ∗ θ) by Table 2, thus ω(¬(ϕ ∗ θ)) = 1.
If ω(¬(ϕ ∗ θ)) = 1 then ω ∈ L3(ϕ ∗ θ). The only options given in Table 2 are
ω ∈ L2(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ) and ω ∈ L3(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ).
ω ∈ L2(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ) =⇒ ω((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) = 1
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ω ∈ L3(ϕ) ∩ L3(θ) =⇒ ω(¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ) = 1
hence
ω(((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)) = 1
Lemma 2. If ⋆ is any binary operator on F satisfying CI1 and CI2 then ⋆ is the Cautious
Improvement operator.
Proof. Suppose ⋆ satisfies
(ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ θ)

ϕ ⋆ θ (CI1)
((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)

¬(ϕ ⋆ θ) (CI2)
We have to prove that Lj(ϕ ⋆ θ) = Lj(ϕ ∗ θ) for j = 1, 2, 3, i.e., that ϕ ⋆ θ ≡ ϕ ∗ θ.
Given any interpretation ω
ω ∈ L1(ϕ ⋆ θ) ⇐⇒ ω((ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ θ)) = 1
⇐⇒ ω ∈ L1(ϕ ∗ θ) (Lemma 1)
similarly,
ω ∈ L3(ϕ ⋆ θ) ⇐⇒ ω(((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)) = 1
⇐⇒ ω ∈ L3(ϕ ∗ θ) (Lemma 1)
Finally, suppose ω ∈ L2(ϕ ⋆ θ). As we are assuming that ⋆ satisfies CI1 and CI2, this is
equivalent to
ω((ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ θ)) ≤ 1/2
and
ω(((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)) ≤ 1/2
which is equivalent, via Lemma 1, to
ω(ϕ ∗ θ) ≤ 1/2
and
ω(¬(ϕ ∗ θ)) ≤ 1/2
This happens if, and only if
ω(ϕ ∗ θ) ≤ 1/2
and
ω(ϕ ∗ θ) ≥ 1/2
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i.e.
1/2 ≤ ω(ϕ ∗ θ) ≤ 1/2
or, equivalently, ω(ϕ ∗ θ) = 1/2 which is equivalent to ω ∈ L2(ϕ ∗ θ).
Hence ω ∈ L2(ϕ ⋆ θ) iff ω ∈ L2(ϕ ∗ θ) thus L2(ϕ ⋆ θ) = L2(ϕ ∗ θ).
Henceforth, ϕ ⋆ θ ≡ ϕ ∗ θ.
Theorem 3. Postulates CI1 and CI2 characterize the Cautious Improvement operator.
Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2.
We can obtain simpler, yet less intuitive, expressions for CI1 and CI2.
Theorem 4. The following are equivalent, respectively, to CI1 and CI2:
ϕ ∗ θ ≡ 1ϕ ∧ θ (CI1’)
¬(ϕ ∗ θ) ≡ 1¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ (CI2’)
Proof. According to CI1,
(ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ (1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ ∧ θ)

ϕ ∗ θ
It is easy to check, using truth tables, that
(ϕ ∧ θ) ∨ (1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ ∧ θ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ (1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ)) ∧ θ
and
(ϕ ∨ (1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ)) ≡ 1ϕ
hence
ϕ ∗ θ

1ϕ ∧ θ
On the other hand, by CI2
((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ)

¬(ϕ ∗ θ)
And again, using truth tables, it is easy to check that
(1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ) ≡ ((1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ∨ ¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ
and
ϕ ∨ (1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ) ≡ 1¬ϕ
thus
¬(ϕ ∗ θ)

1¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ
It is worth to note that Theorem 4 tells us that the cautious improvement operator can
be expressed as a formula of of the logic KS3 + ♦1 + ♦2 in terms of their inputs.
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Theorem 5. Given any two formulas ϕ and θ:
¬(ϕ ∗ θ) ≡ ¬ϕ ∗ ¬θ (CI3)
If θ is not a contradiction, then ϕ ∗ θ is not a contradiction (CI4)
ϕ ∗ θ  θ (CI5)
ϕ  1(ϕ ∗ θ) (CI6)
(ϕ ∗ θ) ∗ θ ≡ θ (CI7)
θ ∗ θ ≡ θ (CI8)
Proof. These six properties can be checked out using truth tables.
Properties CI4 and CI5 respectively represent the Non Contradiction and the Success
principles. On the other hand, CI7 and CI8 tell us how the iterative behavior of this
operator works. It takes exactly two steps to completely replace the original epistemic
state with the new information.
4 General definition of a belief change operator
Now we want to define a general belief change operator.
⊗ : F × F −→ F
A function
k : {1, 2, 3}2 −→ {1, 2, 3}
defines a binary operator ⊗ on three-level preorders over In given by the table:
ω L1(θ) L2(θ) L3(θ)
L1(ϕ) Lk(1,1)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(1,2)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(1,3)(ϕ ⊗ θ)
L2(ϕ) Lk(2,1)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(2,2)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(2,3)(ϕ ⊗ θ)
L3(ϕ) Lk(3,1)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(3,2)(ϕ ⊗ θ) Lk(3,3)(ϕ ⊗ θ)
(3)
Given formulas ϕ and θ, an interpretation ω is in Lk(i,j)(ϕ ⊗ θ) if and only if
ω ∈ Li(ϕ) ∩ Lj(θ). This defines the preorder ϕ ⊗ θ.
Since the function k determines the operator ⊗, there are | {1, 2, 3} ||{1,2,3}|
2
= 33
2
= 39
possible belief change operators in this setting. Different functions yield operators with
different epistemological attitudes. The Cautious Improvement operator defined in Section
3.1, for instance, gives priority to new information (i.e. to the models of θ) but does so in
a cautious manner. For example, if an interpretation ω is a counter model of ϕ and it is a
model of θ then it will be, not a model, but a quasi model of ϕ ∗ θ. Another example could
be the one given by the following table:
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ω L1(θ) L2(θ) L3(θ)
L1(ϕ) L1(ϕ ◦ θ) L2(ϕ ◦ θ) L3(ϕ ◦ θ)
L2(ϕ) L1(ϕ ◦ θ) L2(ϕ ◦ θ) L3(ϕ ◦ θ)
L3(ϕ) L1(ϕ ◦ θ) L2(ϕ ◦ θ) L3(ϕ ◦ θ)
It is easy to see that ϕ ◦ θ ≡ θ for every pair of formulas ϕ and θ. This operator gives
absolute priority to the new information. Also notice that
ϕ ◦ θ ≡ ϕ ∗2 θ ≡ θ
Once defined ⊗ as a binary operator on preorders, we can use Theorem 1 to define ⊗
as a binary operator on formulas.
From Table 3 we can obtain a syntactic characterization of ⊗. In order to do this, we
need to define a set of formulas {
ζkij : i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
}
as follows. For every triple (i, j, k):
1. If k 6= k(i, j) then ζkij = ⊥.
2. If k = k(i, j) then
ζkij = α
k
i ∧ β
k
j
where
αki =


ϕ if i = 1
1ϕ ∧1¬ϕ if i = 2
¬ϕ if i = 3
and
βkj =


θ if j = 1
1θ ∧1¬θ if j = 2
¬θ if j = 3
Observe that for any interpretation ω, regardless the value of k, ω(αki ) = 1 iff ω ∈ Li(ϕ)
and ω(βkj ) = 1 iff ω ∈ Lj(ϕ).
Now we are able to give a syntactic definition of ⊗.
Theorem 6. The following postulates characterize the operator ⊗:
∨
1≤i≤j≤3
ζ1ij

(ϕ ∗ θ) (⊗1)
∨
1≤i≤j≤3
ζ2ij

1(ϕ ∗ θ) ∧1¬(ϕ ∗ θ) (⊗2)
∨
1≤i≤j≤3
ζ3ij

¬(ϕ ∗ θ) (⊗3)
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We divide the proof of Theorem 6 into two lemmas:
Lemma 3. The operator ⊗ defined by the Table 3 satisfies Postulates ⊗1, ⊗2 and ⊗3.
Proof. Let us denote:
φ1 = ϕ ∗ θ
φ2 = 1(ϕ ∗ θ) ∧1¬(ϕ ∗ θ)
φ3 = ¬(ϕ ∗ θ)
Notice that for any interpretation ω
ω(φk) = 1 ⇐⇒ ω ∈ Lk(ϕ ∗ θ)
Fix k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose ω is an interpretation that satisfies
∨
1≤i≤j≤3 ζ
k
ij. Thus, there
is a pair i, j such that ζkij 6= ⊥, i.e., ζ
k
ij is a conjunction α
k
i ∧ β
k
j such that
ω(αki ∧ β
k
j ) = 1.
That is, ω(αki ) = ω(β
k
j ) = 1, hence ω ∈ Li(ϕ) ∩ Lj(θ) and thus ω ∈ Lk(i,j)(ϕ ⊗ θ) by
Table 3 and ω(φk) = 1.
Conversely, suppose that ω(φk) = 1, then ω ∈ Lk(ϕ ∗ θ). According to the definition of
⊗ by Table 3 there is a pair i, j such that k = k(i, j) thus ω ∈ Li(ϕ) ∩ Lj(θ). This implies
that ω(αki ∧ β
k
j ) = 1, hence
ω

 ∨
1≤i≤j≤3
ζkij

 = 1
Lemma 4. If an operator ⋆ satisfies Postulates ⊗1, ⊗2 and ⊗3 then ⋆ and ⊗ are the same
operator.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
5 Related works
There are some interesting works linking modal logic and belief revision. Namely, the works
of Giacomo Bonanno [4, 5]. The aim of these works is to give modal logics in which the
process of revision can be simulated and the original postulates of the AGM framework
are satisfied. Our aim is different in at least two aspects. First, the processes of change
we want to capture in our model differ from the changes proposed in the AGM or KM
(Katsuno-Mendelzon) framework where the believes before the change (and after it) are
represented either as a classical propositional theory or as a classical propositional formula.
We model change in a bit more complex structures. The purpose of the 3-valued logic with
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modalities we use is to be able to represent these structures through the formulas of the
logic and the semantics associated. The second aspect in which our approach differs from
those works is in our postulates, which come naturally from the complex process we want to
model. We may say that our approach to the syntactic postulates is oriented by semantics
and this leads to the discovery of the axioms.
It is worth to note that our modalities of type one (♦1 and 1) are related to ideas
on improvement operators [16, 15, 17]. Actually, 1 is similar to the operator of one
improvement introduced in those works: the effect of this modality consists of improving
by one degree the plausibility of all worlds, whenever possible. Of course, our structures of
three levels do not allow to simulate completely operators as the one-improvement operator,
because these operators can create new levels in the process of revision. In order to simulate
that, we should have structures with at least 3n levels, the maximal length of a total preorder
on In.
Note that Hans Root in his work Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-
Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators [21] analyses the behavior of 27 change operators
looking at the changes in spheres’ systems (alias total preorders). Our work is reminiscent
of this approach and the subtitle of our work is a sort of tribute to his work.
6 Final remarks and future research
6.1 Remarks
This work is a first step in order to have a logic in which formulas represent complex
epistemic states, such as ranking functions on interpretations, a generalization of total
preorders. We have concentrated here in ranking functions taking three values: acceptation,
rejection and indetermination. Mainly, there are three contributions in this work which we
want to remark here:
1. We have defined a modal expansion of the Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic that al-
lows us to describe three-level preorders associated with any formula ϕ in this logic.
Level L1(ϕ), L2(ϕ) and L3(ϕ) are respectively the sets of models, quasi models and
countermodels of ϕ.
2. We have defined semantically all the change operators (39) and, what is most im-
portant, we have introduced a technique to characterize them syntactically in the
Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic with modalities.
3. We have concentrated in a particular, natural and meaningful operator, called cau-
tious improvement operator. This operator has been characterized through two pos-
tulates. Moreover, there is a formula of the new logic constructed in terms of two
formulas which are the input of the operator (the old beliefs and the new piece of
information) such that this formula captures the output of the operator (Theorem 4).
15
4. We have characterized all possible change operators (19,683 in total) in the three-level
structures following the methodology used for characterizing the cautious improve-
ment operator.
6.2 Future work
The main issues we want to develop next are the following:
• To define a complete proof theory for Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic expanded with
♦1 and ♦2.
• To characterize a class of operators in which the new piece of information does not
worsen, that is, it shifts downwards.
• To understand when the operators have a representation as in Theorem 4, that is,
when the formula corresponding to ϕ ∗ θ can be expressed in terms of ϕ and θ within
KS3 + ♦1 + ♦2.
• To generalize the Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic with modalities to a modal 3n-valued
logic which can capture all the ranking functions into 3n values and find the way to
encode in such a logic all known classes of operators.
A Proof of Theorem 2
We consider KS3 + ♦i for i = 1, 2 with only one variable. We have the interpretations
ω1, ω2, ω3 such that ω1(x) = 1, ω2(x) = 1/2 and ω3(x) = 0. Consider the set P =
{P0, P1, . . . , P26} of all preorders on these three interpretations, being P0 the preorder
ω3
ω2
ω1
This is represented by the formula ϕ0 := x in the sense that ω1(ϕ0) = 1, ω2(ϕ0) = 1/2 and
ω3(ϕ0) = 0.
1. In order to prove this result for KS3 + ♦1, we define the operations ¬,1 and ∨ on
the set of preorders. Given preorders P,P ′:
(a) L1(¬P ) = L3(P ), L2(¬P ) = L2(P ) and L3(¬P ) = L1(P ).
(b) L1(1P ) = L1(P ) ∪ L2(P ), L2(1P ) = L3(P ) and L3(1P ) = ∅.
(c) If interpretation ω is at level Li(P ) and level Lj(P
′), then ω is at level Lk(P ∨P
′)
where k = min {i, j}.
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Let us call P0
1
the closure of the set {P0} under these three operations and P0
1
k the
set of the preorders obtained after k or less successive applications of {¬,1,∨}.
Let us say the preorder P belongs to the set F1 if and only if it has one of the following
forms:
ω
ω′
ω2
ω2
ω′
ω
ω
∅
ω′ω′′
ω′ω′′
∅
ω
(4)
We will prove that no preorder in F1 belongs to P0
1
. We do it by induction in the
number of steps, being our base case the application of the operations to P0. These
yield:
¬P0 =
ω1
ω2
ω3
1P0 =
∅
ω3
ω1ω2
P0 ∨ P0 = P0 (5)
Obviously none of those preorders belongs to F1.
Now suppose that no preorder in F1 belongs to P0
1
k.
Given a sequence Pi0 , Pi1 , . . . , Pik , Pik+1 of preorders with i0 = 0 such that Pij+1 is ob-
tained from Pij by an application of one of our operators, suppose, for a contradiction,
that Pik+1 is in F1. Then:
(a) If Pik+1 = ¬Pik then Pik must be in F1 which is a contradiction.
(b) If Pik+1 = 1Pik then L3(Pik+1) is empty thus it is not a linear order and it has
a level which is empty other than L2(Pik+1) hence Pik+1 is not in F1.
(c) If Pik+1 = Pik ∨ P
′ with P ′ a preorder in P0
1
k:
• Suppose Pik+1 is a linear order with ω2 in L3, i.e.
Pik+1=
ω2
ω
ω′
then ω2 must be in both L3(Pik) and L3(P
′) and ω′ must be in L1(Pik)
or L1(P
′). Without loss of generality, we may assume that ω2 ∈ L3(P
′)
and ω′ ∈ L1(P
′). Then necessarily either ω ∈ L2(P
′) and P ′ = Pik+1 or
L2(P
′) = ∅ in P ′. In both cases, we can conclude that P ′ ∈ F1.
• Similarly, if Pik+1 is a linear order with ω2 in L1
Pik+1=
ω
ω′
ω2
then ω must be in both L3(Pik) and L3(P
′) and ω2 must be either in L1(Pik)
or L1(P
′). Again, suppose without loss of generality that P ′ has ω in L3
and ω2 in L1. If ω
′ is not in L2 for P
′ then this level is empty and if ω′ is
in L2 then P
′ = Pik+1 . In both cases, we have P
′ ∈ F1.
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• If Pik+1 has the form
ω
∅
ω′ ω′′
then necessarily:
– ω belongs to level L3(Pk) and L3(P
′).
– ω′ must be either in L1(Pk) or L1(P
′).
– ω must be either in L1(Pk) or L1(P
′).
Suppose that ω′ and ω′′ are in L1(P
′), then
P ′ =
ω
∅
ω′ ω′′
thus P ′ ∈ F1. If this is not the case then necessarily
P ′ =
ω
ω′
ω′′
or P ′ =
ω
ω′′
ω′
We examine only the case
P ′ =
ω
ω′
ω′′
since the other one is symmetric. In this case, necessarily
Pk =
ω
ω′′
ω′
then one of those two preorders is linear with ω2 in one of the extreme levels,
hence one of them is in F1
• Finally, suppose that If Pik+1 has the form
ω′ ω′′
∅
ω
then both Pk and P
′ must have ω′ and ω′′ in L3 and one of them has to have
ω in L1. Suppose that P
′ satisfies these two properties, then P ′ = Pik+1 and
as a consequence P ′ ∈ F1.
As we can see, on each case we contradict the inductive hypothesis, thus it is not
possible that Pik+1 ∈ F1 without incurring in a contradiction. Hence, Pik+1 /∈ F1
thus no element of F1 belongs to the closure of P0 under the given operations.
As a consequence of this, there are preorders in P that have no corresponding
formula in KS3 + ♦1.
18
2. Now to prove that KS3 + ♦2 , in the finite case, cannot capture all the preorders, we
define a new operator 2 for every preorder P as
L1(2P ) = L1(P ) ∪ L2(P ) (6)
L2(2P ) = ∅ (7)
L3(2P ) = L3(P ) (8)
Let us denote by P0
2
the closure of {P0} under operators ¬,2,∨ and by P0
2
k the set
of the preorders obtained by k or less successive applications of these operators. Let
F2 denote the set of the preorders with one of the following configurations:
ω2
ω′
ω
ω
ω′
ω2
∅
ωω′ω′′
∅
∅
ω
ω2ω
′
ω2ω
′
ω
∅
∅
ωω′
ω′′
ω′′
ωω′
∅
We will prove, using induction in the number of steps, that P ∈ P0
2
implies that P
is not in F2.
Our base case consists of applying this operators to P0. As we saw in Equation 5,
neither ¬P0 nor P0 ∨ P0 belong to F2. On the other hand
2P0 =
ω3
∅
ω1ω2
which is clearly not in F2.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume that no preorder in P0
2
k belongs to F2.
Suppose we have a sequence Pi0 , Pi1 , . . . , Pik , Pik+1 of preorders with i0 = 0 such that
Pij+1 is obtained from Pij by an application of one of our operators and assume for a
contradiction that Pik+1 is in F2. Hence:
(a) If Pik+1 = ¬Pik it is immediate that Pik+1 ∈ F2 iff Pik ∈ F2.
(b) Suppose Pik+1 = 2Pik , then L2(Pik+1) is empty, thus Pik+1 does not belong to
F2.
(c) If Pik+1 = Pik ∨ P
′ with P ′ a preorder in P0
2
k we need to consider seven cases.
i. If Pik+1 has the form
ω2
ω′
ω
then ω2 belongs to L3(Pik) and L3(P
′) and ω must be either in L1(Pik) or
L1(P
′). If ω is in L1(P
′) then P ′ must have the form
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ω2ω
′
∅
ω
since otherwise it would be in F2. But then ω
′ must be in L2(Pik) and as
a consequence we obtain that Pik is in F2 wherever we place ω because Pik
would be in one of the following forms
ω2
ω′
ω
ω2
ω′ω
∅
ω2ω
ω′
∅
ii. If Pik+1 is in the form
ω
ω′
ω2
then ω ∈ L3(Pik) and ω ∈ L3(P
′) and ω2 ∈ L1(Pik) or ω2 ∈ L1(P
′). Suppose
ω ∈ L3(P
′) and ω2 ∈ L1(P
′), then we must have ω′ ∈ L3(P
′) or, otherwise,
P ′ belongs to F2 thus P
′ must have the form
ωω′
∅
ω2
But in this case we must have ω′ ∈ L2(Pik) and this implies that Pik is in
one of the following forms:
ω
ω′
ω2
ωω2
ω′
∅
ω
ω2ω
′
∅
hence P ′ /∈ F2 =⇒ Pik ∈ F2.
iii. Suppose Pik+1 has the form
∅
ωω′ω′′
∅
If neither Pik nor P
′ have this form, there are two possible combinations
that yield this:
ω
ω′ω′′
∅
∨
ω′
ωω′′
∅
and
ωω′
ω′′
∅
∨
ω′′
ωω′
∅
but every preorder in the form
ω′′
ωω′
∅
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belongs to F2.
iv. When Pik+1 is in the form
∅
ω
ω2, ω
′
there are two sub cases to consider.
First, suppose without loss of generality that ω2 and ω
′ belong to L1(P
′)
then, as P ′ is not in F2, we must have
P ′ =
ω
∅
ω2ω
′
In this case ω must be at L2(Pik). If Pik is linear ω2 is in L1(Pik) or L3(Pik)
and it is in F2. Thus suppose Pik is not linear, hence it must have ω2 and
ω′ at the same level and wherever we put ω2, ω
′ we obtain that Pik is in F2.
Suppose now, without loss of generality, that ω2 is in L1(Pik) and ω
′ is in
L1(P
′). Observe that Pik cannot be linear in this case and that we already
examined the case when ω2 and ω
′ are both in L1(Pik), thus we can suppose
ω and ω′ are at the same level, which must be L2 or L3. If ω and ω
′ are in
L2(Pik) then
Pik =
∅
ωω′
ω2
which belongs to F2. If, on the other hand, ω and ω
′ are in L3(Pik) we have
that
Pik =
ωω′
∅
ω2
thus ω is in L2(P
′) and P ′ must be in one of the following forms
ω′
ω
ω2
∅
ωω′
ω2
∅
ω
ω2ω
′
and all of these forms are in F2.
v. Suppose Pik+1 has the form
ω2ω
′
ω
∅
In this case we must have ω2, ω
′ ∈ L3(Pik) and ω2, ω
′ ∈ L3(P
′) and necessar-
ily either ω ∈ L2(Pik) or ω ∈ L2(P
′). Thus either Pik+1 = Pik or Pik+1 = P
′
which is not possible because then Pik+1 can be obtained in k steps and it
contradicts the inductive hypothesis.
vi. If Pik+1 has the form
ω′′
ωω′
∅
then necessarily L1(Pik) = L1(P
′) = ∅ and ω′′ is in L3(Pik) and L3(P
′).
If neither Pik nor P
′ belong to F2 the only combination yielding the given
configuration is
ωω′′
ω′
∅
∨
ω′ω′′
ω
∅
as at least one of them have ω2 at level L3, then at least one of them is in
F2.
vii. If Pik+1 has the form
∅
ωω′
ω′′
Suppose, without loss of generality, that ω, ω′ ∈ L2(P
′) then necessarily
P ′ ∈ F2 since it must be in one of the forms
∅
ωω′
ω′′
∅
ωω′ω′′
∅
ω′′
ωω′
∅
Thus we can assume that {ω, ω′} * L2(P ′) and {ω, ω′} * L2(Pik). Since
{ω, ω′} = L2(Pik+1) it must also be the case that {ω, ω
′} * L3(P ′) and
{ω, ω′} * L3(Pik) because if, for instance, we have that {ω, ω
′} ⊆ L3(P
′)
then we need {ω, ω′} ⊆ L2(Pik).
We have a case with ω ∈ L3(Pik), ω
′ ∈ L2(Pik), ω ∈ L2(P
′) and ω′ ∈
L3(P
′) (the other possible case is symmetric) but then necessarily either
ω′′ ∈ L1(Pik) or ω
′′ ∈ L1(P
′). Suppose ω′′ ∈ L1(P
′) (the other case is,
again, symmetric) thus we have one of the following cases:
One possibility is
Pik+1 =
ω′
ω
ω′′
∨
ω
ω′
ω′′
in this case, we have at least one linear order with ω2 at an extreme level,
hence at least one of the preorders is in F2.
Another possible configuration is
Pik+1 =
ω′
ω
ω′′
∨
ω
ω′ω′′
∅
but in this case Pik ∈ F2.
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The remaining possibility is
Pik+1 =
ω′
ω
ω′′
∨
ωω′′
ω′
∅
If ω′ 6= ω2 and ω
′′ 6= ω2 then ω = ω2 and
Pik =
ω2ω
′′
ω′
∅
∈ F2
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